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We empirically examine whether there is discernable variation in the matriculation patterns of 
low-income students at public flagship institutions in the United States around changes in 
institutional financial-aid policies that target resident, low-income students with need-based 
aid. While enrollment responses cannot be attributed to these programs, we do find that 
institutions that introduce income-targeted aid subsequently enroll financially needier and 
geographically more-distant students. These findings imply that “improved" access may 
actually displace some needy students in favor of others. 
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Despite signicant resources being spent on need-based nancial aid in the United States,
in the last three decades the gap between low- and high-income students' matriculation
rates has not only persisted but has widened (e.g., Ellwood and Kane (2000), Havemen
and Wilson (2007)). As such, there continues to be signicant interest in understanding
the underlying patterns of matriculation and any potential sensitivity to policy aimed at
narrowing this gap. Public agship institutions represent an important gateway into higher
education for needy students. Having access to the universe of Pell recipients from 1999-
2007, we build on existing literature by examining whether income-targeted institutional-aid
programs initiated at these institutions inuence the matriculation patterns of low-income
students along several dimensions of access. The Pell Grant is the largest single source of
need-based aid representing $13.7 billion of appropriations in 2007/2008 and representing
over nearly 25 percent of all college going students.1
Need-based aid programs have grown, in part, out of a recognition that the rising real
cost of college and student debt levels have potentially threatened the access of low-income
students to college. For example, while real tuition and fees rose by 63 (43) percent at
private (public) universities between 1993 and 2005 (Trends in College Pricing 2005, The
College Board, Table A1), Mishel, Bernstein, and Allegretto (2007) nd that the real wage
premium rose by 27 percent. Consistent with tightening nancial constraints, Snyder, Tan,
and Homan (2006) show that students are more likely to require student aid to attend
college, that students are covering a smaller portion of their college costs with grants, and,
are taking out nearly twice the level of debt in real terms than in the previous decade
(e.g., over $20,000 in 2004). Partly because federal need-based aid programs have not kept
pace with rising costs (McPherson and Schapiro (1998)), a growing number of states and
institutions have moved toward providing need-based aid, arguably in order to maintain or
increase the accessibility of college to needy students.
In our consideration of the ecacy of income-targeted aid initiatives, we exploit data
covering all dependent Pell Grant recipients in academic years 1999 through 2007, thinking of
ecacy being evidenced in three ways. First, we consider ecacy as evidenced in institutional
enrollments. Establishing the nature of any link between these programs and enrollment is,
of course, of fundamental interest if not importance. This is particularly true as the extant
literature can imply that this population of students is quite inelastic with respect to aid
(e.g., Curs, Singell, and Waddell (2007)). Where conditions allow for a valid test { which we
will discuss in some detail below { we nd no systematic enrollment responses to the policy
innovations.
Second, we consider ecacy as evidenced by the incomes of matriculating-students' fami-
lies. Without family-income data, directly, we will analyze the expected family contributions
(EFC) of matriculating low-income students. In general, EFC is constructed to represent
the amount the applicant-student and/or student's family can be expected to contribute
toward nancing the degree being sought. This expected contribution is estimated from
information regarding the family's income, allowances against their income, the number of
children, and their assets. To focus on the typical college-age student, our analysis uses only
1Federal Pell Grant End-of-Year Report 2007-2008, U.S. Department of Education, Washington, D.C..
1dependent students who by denition rely on parental contributions to attend college. We
establish that the relative need of those who matriculate to at aid-innovating institutions
after the introduction of targeted-aid programs supports that these aid innovations have lead
to a shift toward lower-income Pell students.
Third, we consider ecacy as evidenced in institutions' geographic basins of attraction.
Here we are asking whether these policies change the geographic dispersion of the low-income
students enrolling at these institutions. As other associated costs are unchanging over the
period of our analysis, we will be inclined to interpret any increase in an institution's basin of
attraction as akin to them being better able to draw in low-income students. That is, with an
objective of aid policies being to facilitate the matching of needy students with institutions,
any increase in an institutions basin of attraction is consistent with prior constraints on
the matriculation of low-income students being relaxed. We show that these \basins of
attraction" do change, with students tending to travel relatively farther distances to aid-
innovating institutions after the policy changes. We interpret this evidence as suggestive
that aid policies such as those analyzed can relax geographic barriers (direct, or indirect) to
the enrollment of low-income students. While evaluating the match itself remains outside
our purview, we expect that such movement is in the direction of improving the potential
matching of students with institutions.
In the following section we discuss the related literature and address current shortcomings
that, in part, motivate our analysis. In Section 3 we set up our empirical test given the
changes to nancial-aid policy that fall within the period of data availability. In the process
of doing so, we will identify our exact identication strategy and the way in which one should
consider \treatment" and \control" groups for the purpose of the analysis. In dening this
test, we will also address the inappropriateness of alternative specications (conducting a
similar analysis at private institutions, for example) and set up a falsication exercise that
we will perform along side our examined relationships throughout the paper. In Section 4,
we describe the data used in our analysis and provide some summary statistics that are new
to the literature. We then devote separate sections to each of the three relationships we
examine; enrollment in Section 5, nancial need in Section 6, and basins of attraction in
Section 7. We then share some concluding remarks and discuss several important questions
that remain unanswered.
2 Literature
In the general area of inquiry into student responses to aid, much of the recent work has risen
out of natural experiments in federal, state, and institutional-aid programs (e.g., Angrist
(1993), Bound and Turner (2002), Long (2004), Cornwell, Mustard, and Sridhar (2006)).
Among them, there are several examples where general aid initiatives (i.e., not income-
targeted) are used to consider the matriculation of low-income students (e.g., Hansen (1983),
Kane (1994), Dynarski (2003)). Kane (2007), for example, analyzes the D.C. Tuition Assis-
tance Grant Program (DCTAG), which was made available to all residents of the District of
Columbia regardless of income, and reports that the number of rst-time freshman (depen-
dent) Pell applicants and recipients from D.C. increased between 1999 and 2001, around the
time of the 1999 introduction of DCTAG. Having the universe of Pell recipients available to
2us, we note that 41 of the 50 states experience increases in the number of Pell recipients over
this interval of time, though, which some would consider suggestive that the increases in D.C.
are not attributable to the policy alone. Kane (2007) does report that the increases in D.C.
\were considerably larger than the changes observed in Maryland or Virginia," although
no claim is made that these dierences are statistically signicant. He also nds that the
take-up rate associated with DCTAG is relatively stable across neighborhood-level income
deciles, suggesting that low-income students may not respond dierently to the program
than those of with less nancial need.
Using SAT data and a controlled design, Abraham and Clark (2006) also analyze the
DCTAG, reporting that applications and enrollment rates at eligible institutions rise with
the DCTAG program relative to a control group. This increase is also shown to be pri-
marily at less-selective institutions, which is consistent with Kane (2007), who reports the
enrollment impact was largest at nonselective public four-year colleges and, in particular, at
predominantly black institutions.
Georgia's HOPE Scholarship, which was also more general in application than the initia-
tives we study here, had eligibility requirements that varied by income. As such, Dynarski
(2000) considers the potential inuence of aid adjustments on low-income populations by
exploiting this variation in eligibility. She nds that college enrollment among those from
higher-income families (i.e., above $50,000) responds to the scholarship while that from
lower-income families does not. In a second paper, Dynarski (2004a) also nds that \HOPE
had a substantially greater eect on white attendance than black and Hispanic attendance,"
which she anticipates, given that these groups tend to have lower incomes. Georgia's HOPE
Scholarship, however, had an explicit merit component, thus confounding any dierential re-
sponsiveness across income and ability measures. Likewise, studying California's CalGrant
nancial-aid program, Kane (2003) exploits variation in college price due to merit-based
nancial aid, and nds large impacts of grant eligibility, although these ndings are most
appropriately generalized to high-performing students. In particular, ndings may not be
easily generalized to the low-income population more broadly.
There are several examples that have looked at the Pell Grant specically, in part an
implicit recognition of the prominence of the Pell Grant in the federal nancial aid system.
For example, using variation in the Pell-eligibility formula in the late 1980s that increased
the generosity of the program for nancially independent students, Seftor and Turner (2002)
report increased access for non-traditional students. Singell, Waddell, and Curs (2006) use
institutional level data to show that the HOPE scholarship increased the relative number
of Pell students attending institutions in Georgia, particularly at less-selective four-year
institutions.
Last, consider two recent studies that relate closely to ours insofar as they examine
the ecacy of an aid initiative that were specically need-based. That being said, they
are implicitly targeted toward the academically able as the policy changes occur at elite
institutions. First, Avery et al. (2006) uses administrative and Census data to evaluate the
rst year of Harvard University's Financial Aid Initiative (HFAI), which increased aid to
low-income students. Using estimated family incomes for plausible Harvard applicants, they
nd that HFAI attracted a larger and slightly poorer pool of applicants who, once admitted,
enrolled at rates similar to the prior year. This is consistent with HFAI being eective at
recruiting low-income students out of some otherwise-untapped supply of qualied students
3who would not have applied to Harvard in the absence of such aid.2 Second, Linsenmeier,
Rosen, and Rouse (2006) examine the enrollment eects of changes in nancial aid policies
(i.e., replacing loans with grants) at an anonymous institution (but clearly selective given its
attributes). They report that matriculation by low-income students rose insignicantly in
response to the introduction of the no-loan program, but that low-income minority students
were more responsive, with matriculation rates rising some 8 to 10 percent. Again, however,
these ndings are most appropriately generalized to high-performing students.
The prospect of encouraging low-income students matriculating to the top U.S. insti-
tutions is an important consideration. However, analyzing the matriculation patterns of
low-income students to these elite institutions is arguably to consider a very special case
from among the population of low-income students engaging with post-secondary education.
In fact, our data indicate that of the 384,386 rst-year Pell students attending four-year
institutions in 2000, roughly 0.3 percent enrolled at Ivy League institutions. In the same
year, 15.5 percent are found at public agships, some 49 times more. Not surprisingly, Pell
students who enroll at public agships also tend to originate from areas with lower income
and lower college-going rates, making for more ideal conditions in which to consider the
prospect of whether and how low-income students might respond to targeted aid.3
At the institution level, low-income students are in large measure absent from the elite
private institutions, yet it is these institutions that have provided the evidence of aid e-
cacy thus far, where Pell students typically account for just over one percent of incoming
undergraduate classes. For example, the U.S. Department of Education reports that for in-
coming rst-year undergraduates in 2000, Harvard University enrolled 108 Pell students (of
6,660) and Princeton University enrolled 50 (of 4,570). At the same time, the average public
agship enrolled roughly 749 rst-time Pell students. In fact, the University of Alaska, An-
chorage, while enrolling fewer rst-time Pell students than any other state agship in 2000,
enrolled two times as many Pell students (i.e., 128) as did Princeton. With such limitations
inuencing the external validity of previous studies, we see ample room to contribute to un-
derstanding what is happening to low-SES students around income-targeted aid initiatives
such as those arising at public agships.
2Rothstein and Rouse (2007) also studies a need-based aid initiative, although focusing on debt accu-
mulation and employment outcomes as a result of the initiative. Using data for a selective university that
adopted a no-loan policy under which the loan component of nancial aid awards was replaced with grants,
they assess the causal eect of student debt on employment outcomes, reporting that debt aects students'
academic decisions during college and can be associated with graduates choosing higher-salary jobs and not
choosing poorly paid \public-interest" jobs. Suggestive evidence is also provided that credit constraints and
debt aversion interfere with students' abilities to optimize over the life cycle. For example, debt is found to
reduce students' donations to the institution in the years after they graduate and increases the likelihood
that graduates default on pledges made in their senior years.
3The typical Pell student at a public agship originates from a ZIP code with per-capita income of $20,830
and with 16 percent of adult residents having college degrees, while those at Ivy League schools are coming
from ZIP codes with $24,815 and with 18 percent of adult residents having college degrees, on average.
(Source: 2000 U.S. Census.)
43 Identication
While there are thirty assistance programs of this type introduced over the 1999 through 2007
period, our identication strategy has us exploit only a subset: those programs initiated at
public institutions that limited potential beneciaries to their own state residents. Namely,
we exploit such policies at Minnesota (introduced in 2005), Tennessee (2005), Michigan
(2006), Florida (2006), Indiana (2007), Washington (2007), and Illinois (2007). That this
would dene our strategy is revealed in considering the actual experiment underlying any
relevant ecacy test.4
In particular, note that treatment is not at the institution level but, rather, at the student
level. By extension, where an institution does not limit the set of potential beneciaries by
some exogenous mechanism (e.g., state of residence) there is no well-dened group of com-
parable students against which one can measure the response to treatment. That is, where
no low-income students are excluded from treatment the \control group" is empty.5 As none
of the private institutions have limited the scope of their initiatives by any exogenous mea-
sure (e.g., a student's state of residence), they, along with four public agship institutions,
will not contribute to our test.6 In testing the ecacy of targeted-aid programs, then, our
strategy exploits the existence of state borders and the typical practice of public universities
to oer income-targeted aid only to residents within their respective states. We then mea-
sure the response of treated residents with respect to their own agship against non-treated
non-residents with respect to their agship institutions.
To illustrate our strategy more specically, consider a agship public institution in state
i that newly introduces a program of nancial assistance to low-income residents in state
i who matriculate to the state's agship. Low-income residents of this state may or may
not respond to the policy (which is what we aim to determine). However, as residents
of state j 6= i (i.e., nonresidents from i's perspective) are excluded from the institution's
oer, we expect no direct response from j's residents.7 In fact, residents of state j face the
same relative margins in their matriculation decisions before and after the introduction of
4Among income-targeted programs, there are four typical allocation mechanisms. Given our sample,
and with the exception of the University of Minnesota, we are considering \no-loan" policies that eliminate
loans for low-income students. In 2005, Minnesota adopted a \Pell Grant match" policy that match the
student's Federal Pell Grant. The other types of mechanism include, \loan cap" policies that institute a
low cap on student loans for low-income students (e.g., Brown), and \no parental contribution" policies that
eliminate the parental contribution but retain the student contribution or the standard self-help level (e.g.,
Yale, Stanford).
5As state agships \treat" all resident students in the state, there is likewise no within-state experiment
to be run. In general, one could imagine a regression-discontinuity approach to the research question, using
students around the margin of receiving nancial support, or, around the margin of admission based on non-
nancial consideration. See van der Klaauw (2002) for an example of a regression-discontinuity approach to
examining the relationship between nancial aid and enrollment.
6There are four public agship institutions that also introduce targeted aid but do not limit the potential
recipients exogenously to in-state students (i.e., North Carolina adopted in 2003, Virginia in 2004, Michigan
State in 2006, and Maryland in 2007). We drop these institutions and their associated students.
7Indirectly, they may appear to have responded if, for example, in-state enrollments rise suciently to
crowd out nonresident students. However, to the extent that nonresidents (i.e., students who do not reside
in i) are crowded out by any increase in resident matriculants to i, the bias will be in favor of nding no
eect. For example, as students in i respond to i-specic policy and crowd out students from j, we would
expect j's agship to gain resident students relative to i's agship institution, which attenuates our ndings.
5targeted aid in state i. Moreover, in the absence of the agship institution in state j initiating
a similar program, we would expect no behavioral response whatsoever from j's residents,
toward their own agship institution in particular. It is in this way that we adopt low-
income resident of all states j 6= i as a control group against which to measure the response
of i's low-income students to the policy change at i's agship. We will therefore draw
claims of ecacy only to the extent that i-students' patterns of matriculation change with
the policy change at i's agship institution relative to the observed patterns of j-students'
matriculation to j's agship. The experiments we perform are therefore comparisons of the
matriculation patterns of low-income students when their own public agship institution
initiates a change in policy to the matriculation patterns of low-income students in states
where no such initiative is adopted.
Before we continue, note that the practice of distinguishing residents from nonresidents
in the allocation of nancial assistance provides an opportune falsication exercise. Quite
simply, if there is a signicant response from residents of j (i.e., who are not treated) to
the introduction of income-targeted aid at the agship institution in state i we would be
forced to conclude either that there were unobservable time-varying attributes driving ma-
triculation patterns more generally at institution i (and not just of the type for which we
expect to see response only from in-state students) or that the experiment was altogether
invalid. We therefore perform falsication tests through a comparison of the matriculation
patterns of nonresident low-income students at agships that initiate relevant policies to the
matriculation patterns of nonresident low-income students at other agships that do not.
As nonresident students are not being treated by the policy, there should be no systemati-
cally occurring relative dierence in the realized matriculation patterns at treated agship
institutions from this group of students.8
4 Data
Our primary data source is the Pell \recipient le" held by the oces of the U.S. Department
of Education, obtained through our request under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).
While the dataset includes all Pell recipients over the academic years 1999 through 2007
(at roughly six million observations per year), we use only those students who are recorded
as rst-time, dependent recipients in their rst year at one of the 70 ocial state agship
institutions. Independent students are dropped from the analysis as they are recognized by
the literature as having dierent attributes and patterns of behavior (e.g., Seftor and Turner
(2002)). We also drop student-level observations where we are unable to match them with
an institution within the IPEDS dataset using the mapping of Pell-provided institution code
8In terms of potential bias in the falsication exercise, note that to the extent residents of i (i.e., part
of j's nonresident population) might forgo an out-of-state alternative when they respond to i's policy (e.g.,
they forgo the agship in state j 6= i), the bias will be in favor of nding relative dierences in matriculation
patterns between treatment and control. For example, as students in i respond to i-specic policy, j's agship
may well lose nonresident students relative to treated agship institutions, which would yield a positive
coecient on the treatment variable in the nonresident falsication model. We will therefore interpret
nding no signicant relative dierence as secondary evidence of the ecacy of the targeted-aid programs.
The use of out-of-state, low-income students could also be problematic if the school itself chooses to substitute
in-state, low-income students for out-of-state students.
6to IPEDS institution code. We are condent, however, that this problem is primarily one
that exists outside of the well-established institutions we analyze here. Moreover, as this
type of data issue would keep entire institutions from appearing in our nal sample, that we
have the entire set of state agships is consistent with having no missing students at these
institutions.9
To receive federal aid, a student must rst complete a Free Application for Federal
Student Aid (FAFSA) form, which provides aid administrators with the information needed
to determine the size of an applicants Pell Grant. Related research has relied on indirect
measures for the number of low-income students, such as minority enrollments or other
student background measures that are correlated with income (e.g., Kane (1994), Dynarski
(2004b)). To the contrary, our analysis exploits unique student-level Pell data to directly
examine the eects of changes in aid policy on low-income students. Furthermore, the
program size ensures that to a large extent our data constitute the most comprehensive
representation of poor students attending U.S. higher-educational institutions.
5 Enrollment response
In order to accommodate the policy implementation across multiple time periods, we set up
the following dierence-in-dierence model with a full set of time-period indicators and a
policy indicator dened to be unity for institutions and time periods that are subject to the
policy.
As a general framework, then, we are interested in the estimate of  in the following
time-series/cross-section model:
ln(LIenrollit) = xit + Tit + i + t + it; (1)
where LIenrollit captures the low-income enrollment at institution i in academic year t
(which we measure as the number of Pell recipients), and Tit is the treatment variable,
dened to be unity for institutions and time periods (i;t) that are subject to the treatment.
The model includes a full set of institution eects, i, and a full set of time eects, t.
As institution xed eects will not account for other time-varying factors that inuence
LIenrollit, xit includes the log-cost of attendance (e.g., tuition, fees) and the state-level log-
population of rst-year, low-income students enrolled in four-year institutions within each
state. Institution-specic errors are captured in it. An identifying assumption of the above
model is that low-income students in treatment and control groups are on similar trends
in low-income enrollment before the introduction of targeted aid. We nd no evidence of
dierential trending.10
9We note that the student counts provided in the \recipient les" of the Department of Education are a
perfect match with the administrative records of our own institution, the University of Oregon, supporting
a certain condence in the data.
10The existence of dierential pre-treatment trends, where such to exist, would introduce bias into the
estimated treatment coecient. For example, if resident, low-income enrollment was rising faster at treated
agship institutions then this methodology would falsely attribute any continuation of this trend to the
targeted-aid programs themselves. Modeling ln(LIenrollit) as cubic in t, we nd no signicant dierences
by treatment and control group in pre-treatment trends.
7In Column (1) of Table 1 we report the estimated coecients of Equation (1), which
operates as an empirical test of the ecacy of targeted-aid programs as measured by the
total enrollment of resident low-income students. With respect to the treatment variable, the
point estimate suggests that targeting low-income students has not increased the low-income
enrollment levels among the treated. Given the degree of noise in the estimated coecient,
however, we conclude that while targeted-aid policies cannot be credited with attracting
needy in-state students to state agship institutions, there is insucient evidence to claim
that the policies have been detrimental. This is consistent with Linsenmeier et al. (2006),
who nd no signicant overall enrollment eect associated with similar policy changes at an
elite institution. We also consider that to the extent that information transmission plays a
role in any enrollment response, one might see enrollment eects with a lag. (Although this
is inconsistent with the responsiveness of EFC and student proximity we document below.)
We report the estimates from the falsication exercise in Column (2) of Table 1, where we
expect no signicant predictive power in the treatment variable. While this specication re-
veals signicant patterns with respect to costs of attendance and the number of Pell students
in the population, as expected, the treatment variable remains insignicant in predicting the
low-income enrollment of nonresident students. This is expected given that no such student
is treated by the initiated policies.11
{ Table 1 approximately here {
While not a falsication test, per se, analyzing the enrollment of low-income students
at alternative institutions may well suggest a possible path of substitution. For example,
we considered all non-agship publics in each state and measure the low-income enrollment
in a similar pre-post design, dening treatment at the state level as the state's residents
having been treated by the implementation of targeted aid programs by the state's agship
institution. In so doing, we nd that the non-agship, public institution do lose low-income
students when the state's agship introduces targeted aid to low-income families. However,
while the point estimates (not reported) are larger negatives they are measured imprecisely
and are not separable from zero, as in Table 1. Likewise, if we adopt all similarly sized
non-agship publics as the comparator group we nd no signicant enrollment response.12
Table 1 also highlights the importance of residency status in considering the elasticity
of enrollment to costs of attendance. In fact, we nd no enrollment response with (time-
series) variation in costs among resident, low-income students, where non-resident enrollment
increases signicantly as costs increase, with a 10-percent increase in tuition yielding a 5-
student increase in low-income enrollment at the mean enrollment level in the sample (relative
to a mean nonresident enrollment of 132 in 1999). The positive elasticity suggests that it may
be dicult to separate price eects from the correlation of price and quality (either real or
11Cast dierently, one might be inclined to model the (untreated) nonresident enrollment as a kind of
dierence in dierence in dierence specication. If the two samples are pooled, with the resident low-
income enrollment response to treatment also measured against the \response" on nonresident low-income
enrollments, there is the suggestion that enrollment increases with treatment.
12Note that this is an indirect test of the ecacy of the initiatives in a way that analyzing changes to
expected family income or basins of attraction would not be. For example, while we might expect that any
enrollment response at a treated agship would be to draw low-income students away from other non-agship
publics in the state, there is no reason to believe that such would draw those of dierent wealth or proximity.
8perceived, since time-invariant institutional heterogeneity is absorbed in the error structure
of the model). We will return to this point when considering the distance models below
where we learn more about the underlying patterns by considering the price eect across the
student-proximity distribution. An alternative explanation that is possible where institutions
enjoy excess demand from out-of-state students and are in search of higher revenues in that
they may admit more nonresident students while raising nonresident tuition. The state-level
population of low-income students attending four-year institutions has the expected sign,
and magnitudes that seem quite plausible given the selectivity of the institutions within our
sample (i.e., elasticities of roughly 1).
6 Family income
As in the enrollment model above, our empirical objective is to capture any changes in
expected family contributions (EFC) that systematically relate to the timing of \no-loan"
policy implementation, using untreated students as \control" observations. With EFC,
however, the implementation of such analysis is somewhat nontrivial. For example, EFC
is determined formulaically by the FAFSA and is a function of student attributes (e.g.,
increasing in family income, number of dependent children in the student's family). In
practice, however, no family is expected to contribute negatively and we only observe the
student-specic EFC after the application of a non-negativity constraint.
In Table 2, we provide several alternative specications as a transparent attempt to doc-
ument that our results are not peculiar to any particular exercise and to reveal to the extent
possible the variation that exists in EFC around the introduction of these aid initiatives.
In Column (1), we rst report a linear probability model of the form
Prob(EFCsit > 0) = xsit + Tsit + i + t + sit; (2)
where EFCsit captures the expected family contribution of resident low-income student s
at institution i in academic year t. In (2), Tsit is the treatment variable, dened to be
unity for students and time periods that are subject to the treatment. Again, as in the
enrollment model, we include a full set of institution indicators in i, a full set of time eects
in t, the log-cost of attendance (e.g., tuition, fees) and the log-population of rst-year low-
income students enrolled in four-year institutions in xsit. Student-level errors are captured
in sit. As was the case in Eq. (1), the identifying assumption of Eq. (2) requires that low-
income students in treatment and control states trend similarly prior to the introduction
of treatment. Finding no evidence of dierential trending in the data, we can conrm the
validity of this assumption.13
The dependent variable is set to unity for all positive EFC and is otherwise zero, yielding
coecients on the treatment variable that are intended to capture the marginal change
in the propensity for a low-income student at a given institution to have at least some
nancial assistance expected from the student's family. The results of the baseline model
in Column (1) indicate that there is a signicant decrease in the probability that students
13Modeling Prob(EFCsit > 0) as cubic in t, we nd no signicant dierences by treatment and control
group in pre-treatment trends.
9will matriculate with the expectation of nancial assistance from family associated with
the introduction of targeted aid programs of the type being considered. That is to say,
conditional on enrollment, treated low-income students are roughly 2-percent less likely to
have positive EFC. As specied, however, there is nothing in the linear probability model
of Column (1) bounding the projected probabilities to the unit interval. Yet, importantly,
institution xed eects can be estimated without yielding bias.
{ Table 2 approximately here {
In Column (2), we report the estimated coecients of what amounts to the comparable
conditional logit model, to bound the projected probabilities to the unit interval. With
a rather large dataset, where each group has many observations and there are multiple
positive outcomes per group, conditional logit can be a very dicult estimation to perform.
We therefore exploit the equivalence of the conditional logistic regression likelihood function
and the Cox proportional hazard likelihood function in in Column (2).14 Doing so again
reveals that associated with the introduction of targeted aid programs, there is a signicant
decrease in the likelihood that students will matriculate with the expectation of family
assistance. Conditional on enrollment, this specication suggests that treated low-income
students are roughly 2.9-percent less likely to have positive EFC.
In Column (3) we report on a probit specication with institution indicator variables.
While not yielding the unbiased estimation of parameters as in the Chamberlain procedure of
Column (2), this alternative specication yields an estimate of the key parameter of interest
that is suggestive of the same empirical regularity in the data. As the treatment coecient
estimate does not substantively change across columns (1) through (3), we are inclined to
suggest that neither the unboundedness of the OLS specication nor the potential bias from
the incidental parameter problem in the probit specication are cause for concern. Moreover,
neither the sign nor economic signicance across these alternatives { treated students being
roughly 2-to-3 percent likely to have levels of family wealth that yield positive EFC { raise
concern that our results are sensitive in any meaningful way.
Given the nature of the Pell Program's formulaic determination of need, EFC has a
continuous component (which is increasing in family wealth, ceteris paribus) that has infor-
mation of interest in considering the question of ecacy. However, the true expected family
contribution is some latent variable, EFC?, such that EFCsit = max(0;EFC?
sit). In Column
(4), we report the estimated coecients of a Tobit-equivalent to the specication in Eq. (2).
Here again we see evidence that targeted aid has drawn students of relatively lower means,
with the estimated coecient on the treatment variable implying a 25-percent decrease in
the underlying family contribution (i.e., EFC?). We interpret this large increase as partly
reecting the mass at zero EFC.
14For example, the -clogit- command in Stata uses an exact calculation to handle multiple positive out-
comes. Thus, if there are 5,000 observations per group and 1,000 positive outcomes within a group, -clogit-
must calculate how many ways 1,000 subjects can be drawn from a pool of 5,000.
Q5;000
k=4;001 k exceeds that
which can be recorded, even in double precision. Our models fail to converge using Stata on a Linux box
with 16GB of RAM. In order to achieve convergence, then, we note that -stcox- can be used to estimate
-clogit- models and vice versa. While there is no reason to do so in general, -stcox- oers alternative methods
by which one can handle the multiple positive outcomes within group. The default method it exploits is the
Breslow approximation to the exact calculation, by which we are able to handle multiple positive outcomes
in our data. A nice demonstration of equivalency is available at stayconsistent.wordpress.com.
10{ Table 3 approximately here {
The associated falsication exercises are reported in columns (1) through (4) of Table 3,
which shows no such pattern in the data. That is, in each case a comparable specication on
nonresident low-income students shows no systematic relationship around the introduction of
these aid programs. Holistically, these four specications and their accompanying falsication
tests conrm that targeted aid programs of the nature adopted by agship public universities
lead to more-needy student attending these institutions. Given that the number of needy
students does not increase at agship institutions, which may be the result of explicit or
implicit capacity constraints, these ndings may be seen as somewhat provocative as they
can imply that \improved" access may actually displace some (relatively wealthy) needy
students in favor others.
7 Basins of attraction
Avery et al. (2006), Linsenmeier et al. (2006) and Rothstein and Rouse (2007) suggest that
the types of programs under our analysis should permit a better matching of students with
institutions. Here, we consider the geographic basins of attraction around each university
in our sample of agships { the area from which the institutions draw low-income students.
In particular, we anticipate that to the extent credit constraints on low-income students
are systematically relaxed with the introductions of additional aid opportunities, improved
matching may well be exhibited in the distances from which students travel to attend the
state's agship institution.
7.1 Average student proximity by targeted-aid regime
As before, for our analysis of basins of attraction, we set up the following dierence-in-
dierence model with a full set of time-period indicators and a policy indicator dened to
be unity for institutions and time periods that are subject to the policy.
As a general framework, we are interested in the estimate of  in the following model:
ln(Distancesit) = xsit + Tsit + i + t + sit; (3)
where Distancesit captures the distance (km) between (resident, low-income) student s's
home addresses and institution i in academic year t, and Tit is the treatment variable, dened
to be unity for students and time periods that are subject to the treatment by institution i.
As in the enrollment model, the distance models include a full set of institution eects, i, a
full set of time eects, t, and in xsit the log-cost of attendance (e.g., tuition, fees) and the
state-level log-population of rst-year, low-income students enrolled in four-year institutions.
Student-level errors are captured in sit.15
{ Table 4 approximately here {
15As in earlier specications, the identifying assumption here is again that low-income students in treat-
ment and control states trend similarly prior to the introduction of treatment. Finding no evidence of
dierential trending in the data, we can conrm the validity of this assumption.
11In Column (1) of Table 4 we report the estimated coecients of Equation (3) which
operates as an empirical test of the ecacy of targeted-aid programs measured in terms
of the average proximity of resident low-income students (i.e., the distance between their
home addresses and the institution). In short, the data reveal a signicant increase in
the relative ability of policy-innovating institutions to attract low-income students, with the
point estimate suggesting the average resident low-income student travels 4.6-percent farther
when treated. Recalling that there are no signicant enrollment responses to treatment, these
ndings again seem to suggest that \improved" access may be displacing some needy students
in favor others. In Column (2), we report the estimates from the falsication exercise. As
was the case in the earlier falsication attempts, we nd no signicant predictive power in
the treatment variable. This is expected, of course, given that no such student is treated by
the initiated policies.
7.2 Distance quantiles by targeted-aid regime
Figure 1 produces the kernel density estimates of low-income student proximity to their
associated institutions in 2000. As can be seen in the gure, the distribution of campus
proximity is skewed right. This pattern is expected and occurs in all sample years. For
example, in 2000, the median proximity was 66 km while the mean proximity was 118 km.
In some sense, there is a smallness to the low-income-student market at state agships,
with 25 percent of (rst-year, dependent) Pell students at agship institutions in our sample
reporting their ocial residence (prior to matriculation) within 13.7 km of campus. In this
way, it seems a valuable exercise to establish the robustness of the above proximity result
to dierent points along the distribution, for these programs, by their nature, may well
experience dierential eects on students across the distance range. Thus, as a complement to
the analysis of Equation (3), we set up a quantile-regression model with a particular interest
in the robustness of the treatment eect to considering dierent ranges of the proximity
distribution.
In Table 5 we largely establish that the proximity eect is realized over a large range of
the distribution of proximity. In Figure 2 we report the coecient estimate and condence
intervals corresponding to the treatment variable derived from equivalent specications over
the entire range of proximity quantiles. Overall, the clear implication is that there are
signicant and general increases in the basins of attraction where institutions have introduced
income-targeted aid and not where aid regime was unchanged. The associated falsication
exercises are reported separately in Table 6, which again reveal no predictive power in the
treatment variable but for the interval around the 75th percentile.16
{ Table 5 approximately here {
{ Table 6 approximately here {
While these relative increases are not present in the matriculation patterns of (untreated)
nonresident students, Table 6 does reveal an interesting pattern across the proximity distri-
bution in the underlying behavior of low-income students around changes in COA. Note that
16While proportional measures of treatment response suggest a monotonically decreasing eect throughout
the range of distances, we note that the absolute distance implied by the estimates is inverted-U shaped.
12the price eect (on distance quartiles) reverses sign over higher distance quantiles. Given that
the dependent variable is not enrollment, we are somewhat cautious but nonetheless inclined
to interpret this in light of the earlier nonresident enrollment result { COA being positively
related to low-income nonresident enrollment levels after absorbing time-invariant institu-
tion eects into the error structure. Clearly, COA positively inuences the 10th-quantile
distance yet positively inuences distance at or above the median. As the confounding of
price and quality eects are often suggested as a reason for the positive correlation of price
and enrollment, this can be viewed as a challenge to the often-implied prior that students
closer to the institution are better informed about the true quality. One interpretation of
this quantile-dependent COA pattern is that the more geographically distant is a student,
the greater are the student's individual costs to attending and the greater their incentive to
determine quality independent of price. (Price then has the eect of decreasing market size.)
We thus allow that institution controls may be insucient to capture time-varying student
attributes.
8 Conclusion
We use unique data on all Pell students between 1999 and 2007, that constitutes the most
comprehensive representation of poor students entering higher education over this period, to
examine the access eects of the introduction of targeted, need-based aid programs available
to in-state students at several agship public institutions. In particular, we use a series
of dierence-in-dierence regressions to examine whether institutions that adopted targeted
need-based aid programs for in-state students experienced any systematic increase in the
number of (rst-time, rst-year, dependent) Pell students, the income of matriculating Pell
students or their proximity to campus.
Our analysis strongly suggests that targeted-aid programs inuence the behavior of needy
students, but in a subtle way. Specically, enrollment models generate negative but in-
signicant point estimates of enrollment gains from adopting a targeted need-based aid
program. At the same time, models of EFC and proximity (as measured by the distance
between the institution and their ocial residence prior to matriculation) indicate that
institutions that introduce these programs subsequently enroll more-nancially-needy and
more-geographically-distant students. Quantile regressions also indicate that these aid pro-
grams generate a non-linear (i.e., an inverted-U) eect on proximity with maximum eect
well below the mean distance. Overall, the data support that targeted need-based aid pro-
grams do not change the overall number of needy students, but instead change the prole
and composition of students, and toward students who historically may have had less access
to these institutions.
As a falsication exercise, we replicate these analyses using nonresident Pell students
who are ineligible for the targeted need-based aid. We nd no systematic responses from
nonresident, low-income students, which supports the assumption that there are no unob-
servable time-varying attributes driving matriculation patterns at treated institutions more
generally.
These ndings are important as they suggest that institutions can inuence broad access
objectives by using need-based aid and that Pell students are responsive to nancial incen-
13tives. These ndings are also somewhat provocative insofar as they suggest that measurable
inuences are more compositional, in nature. That is, as in the higher-ability population
considered in Linsenmeier et al. (2006), we nd no signicant enrollment eect associated
with similar policy changes at agship public institutions, where low-income students are
much more prevalent and more representative of the wider population of needy students.
One might consider that active capacity constraints may well imply that \improved" access
in a matching sense may actually displace some needy students in favor of others. Col-
lectively, our ndings are consistent with Rothstein and Rouse (2007) insofar as increased
basins of attraction are suggestive that need-based aid programs reduce credit constraints.
Our ndings are also consistent with the Avery et al. (2006) hypothesis that these programs
permit students to better match within the hierarchy of institutions.
While it is possible that improved access and consequent displacement could work towards
a need-blind process where needy students are appropriately matched within the hierarchy of
institutions, further work must be done to understand the full general-equilibrium enrollment
and access eects of such programs. For example, Linsenmeier et al. (2006), analyzing stu-
dent responses to one of the earliest adopters of targeted need-based aid in the country, nds
statistically signicant enrollment gains in low-income minority populations. However, it is
unclear whether such programs would have similar ecacy in light of the adoption of similar
programs at comparable institutions. Given data such as ours, we are unable to test for
dierential eects across race. However, future work should consider samples of institutions
with competing need-based aid programs in order to tease out the general-equilibrium eects
of need-base aid and their implications for low-income and minority populations across the
full distribution of ability. Overall, the patterns we identify in EFC and proximity around
such initiatives suggest that the impact of these programs may well be subtle.
14Table 1: Institution-level enrollment of low-income students around the adoption
of income-targeted aid
The dependent variable is equal to the log of low-income enrollment (i.e.,
which we measure as the number of Pell recipients) at institution i in aca-
demic year t. All specications include a full set of institution eects and a





Treatment period -0.0607 -0.145
[0.0464] [0.0925]
ln(Cost of attendance) -0.0578 0.500***
[0.0722] [0.144]
ln(Resident Pell population) 1.074*** 0.243
[0.0777] [0.155]




Institution controls Yes Yes
Year controls Yes Yes
Observations / Institutions 630/70 630/70
R2 0.38 0.06
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses.
15Table 2: Resident EFC around the adoption of income-targeted aid at agship public institutions
In columns (1) through (3), the dependent variable is equal to one if the student's expected family con-
tribution (EFC) is positive (i.e., a family contribution is expected to be made). Estimated coecients
are reported in Column (1), estimated logit coecients are reported in Column (2) and estimated probit
marginal eects are reported in Column (3). In Column (4), the dependent variable is equal to student
s's EFC at institution i in academic year t, continuous for positive values and left-censored at zero. All
specications include a full set of institution and time indicators.
Linear Conditional Probit Tobit
Probability Logita
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment period -0.020*** -0.029** -0.017*** -0.182***
(0.005) (0.013) (0.005) (0.052)
ln(Cost of attendance) 0.017*** 0.025*** 0.015*** 0.183***
(0.003) (0.009) (0.003) (0.036)
ln(Resident Pell population) 0.002 -0.005 0.014 -0.127
(0.012) (0.031) (0.012) (0.123)
ln(Nonresident Pell population) 1.733*** 2.638*** 1.776*** 17.807***
(0.313) (0.872) (0.310) (3.319)
Constant -21.984*** -225.538***
(4.123) (43.326)
Institution xed eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year xed eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations / Institutions 420,057/70 420,057/70 420,057/70 420,057/70
F(12;419975) = 2(12) = 2(81) = 2(81) =
148.5 510.5 13397.98 13869.63
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. a As discussed in the text, we exploit the equivalency
of the Cox proportional hazard likelihood and the conditional logit likelihood in achieving convergence.
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6Table 3: Nonresident EFC around the adoption of income-targeted aid at agship public institutions
In columns (1) through (3), the dependent variable is equal to one if the student's expected family con-
tribution (EFC) is positive (i.e., a family contribution is expected to be made). Estimated coecients
are reported in Column (1), estimated logit coecients are reported in Column (2) and estimated probit
marginal eects are reported in Column (3). In Column (4), the dependent variable is equal to student
s's EFC at institution i in academic year t, continuous for positive values and left-censored at zero. All
specications include a full set of institution and time indicators.
Linear Conditional Probit Tobit
Probability Logita
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment period -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.057
(0.011) (0.029) (0.011) (0.112)
ln(Cost of attendance) 0.051*** 0.073*** 0.049*** 0.571***
(0.006) (0.018) (0.006) (0.066)
ln(Resident Pell population) -0.005 -0.015 0.003 -0.265
(0.023) (0.062) (0.024) (0.237)
ln(Nonresident Pell population) -0.233 -0.448 -0.132 -5.324
(1.091) (2.952) (1.093) (11.146)
Constant 3.227 69.719
(14.269) (144.432)
Institution xed eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year xed eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations / Institutions 88,224/70 88,224/70 88,224/70 88,224/70
F(12;88142) = 2(12) = 2(81) = 2(81) =
23.60 76.92 2279.41 2480.57
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. a As discussed in the text, we exploit the equivalency
of the Cox proportional hazard likelihood and the conditional logit likelihood in achieving convergence.
1
7Table 4: Proximity responses to the adoption of income-targeted aid at agship
public institutions
The dependent variable is equal to the log of the distance (km) between
the student's home address and their institution. All specications include






Treatment period 0.060*** 0.026
(0.015) (0.028)
ln(Cost of attendance) 0.075*** -0.122***
(0.010) (0.016)
ln(Resident Pell population) 0.091*** -0.069
(0.035) (0.059)




Institution controls Yes Yes
Year controls Yes Yes
Observations / Institutions 420,056/70 88,224/70
Overall R2 .06 .00
Mean distance (km) 116.1 967.6
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses.
18Table 5: Resident proximity-response to the adoption of income-targeted aid at agship public institutions, by
proximity quantiles
The dependent variable is equal to the log of the Xth distance quantile between home addresses
and institutions', where X is given by the column heading. All specications include a full set
of institution eects and a full set of time eects, over annual institution-level observations.
10th 25th Median 75th 90th
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Treatment period 0.237*** 0.131*** 0.064*** 0.007* -0.004
(0.023) (0.018) (0.010) (0.004) (0.003)
ln(Cost of attendance) -0.175*** -0.017 0.065*** 0.015*** 0.002
(0.019) (0.013) (0.007) (0.003) (0.002)
ln(Resident Pell population) 0.118** -0.104** 0.049** 0.070*** 0.027***
(0.055) (0.042) (0.024) (0.009) (0.007)
ln(Nonresident Pell population) 2.222 -1.693 -0.440 0.521** 0.342*
(1.455) (1.128) (0.651) (0.234) (0.194)
Constant -26.671 25.666* 8.895 -2.805 0.492
(18.995) (14.735) (8.503) (3.052) (2.528)
Institution controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 420,056 420,056 420,056 420,056 420,056
Pseudo R2 0.11 0.17 0.20 0.23 0.21
Distance (km) 3.6 14.9 64.5 167.5 292.5
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses.
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9Table 6: Nonresident proximity-response to the adoption of income-targeted aid at agship public institutions,
by proximity quantiles
The dependent variable is equal to the log of the Xth distance quantile between home addresses
and institutions', where X is given by the column heading. All specications include a full set
of institution eects and a full set of time eects, over annual institution-level observations.
10th 25th Median 75th 90th
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Treatment period 0.007 0.023 0.012 0.050*** 0.018
(0.018) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.020)
ln(Cost of attendance) 0.022** -0.004 -0.032*** -0.033*** -0.071***
(0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
ln(Resident Pell population) -0.002 -0.044 -0.064* -0.049 0.065
(0.037) (0.033) (0.035) (0.035) (0.040)
ln(Nonresident Pell population) 0.821 -1.219 -2.593 -2.499 2.431
(1.713) (1.568) (1.657) (1.629) (1.814)
Constant -6.067 21.648 40.094* 39.576* -23.930
(22.204) (20.322) (21.474) (21.110) (23.511)
Institution controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 88,224 88,224 88,224 88,224 88,224
Pseudo R2 0.29 0.26 0.22 0.21 0.18
Distance (km) 66.5 184.8 453.5 1,171.9 2,973.1
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses.
2
0Figure 1: The proximity of resident, low-income students
This gure reproduces kernel density estimates of the (km) distance between
each state's agship institution(s) and the reported residences of rst-year
Pell students attending their own-state agship institutions in 2000 as resi-
dents.
21Figure 2: Estimated treatment eect at distance quantiles, by residency
Panel A: Resident low-income students
Panel B: Nonresident low-income students
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